This paper investigates to what extent preference heterogeneity helps account for two observations that challenge standard life-cycle theory: (i) The richest 1% of households hold at least 25% of total wealth. (ii) Households with similar lifetime earnings hold very di¤erent amounts of wealth. The key idea is to infer the distribution of preference parameters from data on how consumption and wealth inequality vary as cohorts age. I …nd that time preference heterogeneity helps account for wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings, but makes at most a modest contribution towards accounting for high wealth observations. Heterogeneity in risk aversion has only minimal e¤ects on saving and wealth inequality.
Introduction
Life-cycle theory is the standard theoretical framework for studying consumption and saving behavior (Browning and Crossley 2001 ). Yet quantitative life-cycle models have di¢ culties accounting for two key features of the observed wealth distribution:
1. The richest 1% of households hold around one-third of total wealth (Budria et al. 2002) .
Even in data that fail to capture the upper tail of the wealth distribution, the richest 1% of households hold about one-quarter of total wealth.
2. There is substantial wealth dispersion among households with similar lifetime earnings (Venti and Wise 2000; Hendricks 2004) or, more generally, among observationally similar households (e.g., Hurst et al. 1998 ).
Several authors have interpreted this as evidence of preference heterogeneity. Venti and Wise (2000) conclude that households in similar circumstances make very di¤erent saving decisions. Charles and Hurst (2003) and Knowles and Postlewaite (2003) argue that parents transmit their propensity to save to their children. Quantitative models with preference heterogeneity have been proposed by Andolfatto and Redekop (1998) , Krusell and Smith (1998) , Samwick (1998) , and Guvenen (2002) .
Household survey data support the notion of preference heterogeneity. Empirical estimates of consumption Euler equations indicate heterogeneity in time preference (Lawrance 1991 ) and in risk aversion or intertemporal substitution elasticities (Vissing-Jorgenson 2002; Attanasio and For helpful comments I am grateful to seminar participants at Iowa State University. Browning 1995) . Substantial heterogeneity is also found in survey data that are designed to reveal households' preference parameters (Barsky et al. 1997 ; Charles and Hurst 2003) . Barsky et al. (1997) and Knowles and Postlewaite (2003) relate households'self-reported preferences and attitutes to observed saving decisions.
The question addressed in this paper: To what extent do parsimonious models of preference heterogeneity help account for the two observations that challenge life-cycle theory?
The approach: The main di¢ culty in addressing this question is how preference parameters can be inferred from data on consumption and saving behavior. The key idea of the paper is to exploit the fact that preference heterogeneity a¤ects how consumption and wealth inequality change with age.
To illustrate the intuition underlying this approach, consider the simplest life-cycle model in which agents are identical except for their discount factors. Patient households choose steeper ageconsumption pro…les than do impatient households. As a result, consumption inequality increases with age, at least among older households. The degree of time preference heterogeneity may then be inferred from data on the age pro…le of consumption inequality. Similarly, patient households accumulate more wealth than do impatient households. As a result, wealth inequality should increase with age in a way that can be exploited to infer the distribution of preference parameters.
Based on this idea, I measure the importance of preference heterogeneity for wealth inequality as follows. I develop a quantitative life-cycle model of the kind that has been used previously to study the wealth distribution. The model is based on Huggett's (1996) benchmark study and features …nitely lived households who are subject to uninsured earnings and mortality risk. Each household is endowed with a …xed vector of preference parameters. The distribution of preference parameters is chosen to replicate how consumption or wealth inequality change with age in U.S. data. Comparing the equilibria of models with and without preference heterogeneity o¤ers a measure of how much preference heterogeneity helps account for high wealth observations and for the observed relationship between lifetime earnings and wealth.
To prevent the theory from becoming vacuous, some restrictions must be imposed on the variation of preference parameters over time. Consistent with most previous studies, I restrict the analysis to models where each household is endowed with time-invariant preferences. 1 Furthermore, I assume that preference parameters are not correlated with other household characteristics, such as labor endowments.
Findings: I …nd that time preference heterogeneity makes only a modest contribution towards accounting for the observed concentration of wealth. If preference parameters are chosen to replicate how consumption or wealth inequality change with age, the richest 1% of model households own 14% of total wealth, compared with 11% when all households have identical preferences. In the data, the corresponding …gure is at least 25%. A further shortcoming of models with time preference heterogeneity is that too many (impatient) households own no wealth.
Time preference heterogeneity is more successful in accounting for the observed relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth. Without preference heterogeneity, life-cycle models tend to predict a very tight relationship between these two variables. The correlation coe¢ cient is often above 0.9. In contrast to the data, households with similar lifetime earnings hold similar amounts of wealth (Hendricks 2004) . Time preference heterogeneity reduces the correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth to about 0.7 (compared with 0.5 in the data) and enables the model to replicate empirical measures of wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings. The model economies also come very close to matching the observed age pro…les of consumption and wealth inequality.
Heterogeneity in risk aversion, on the other hand, has only very minor implications for wealth inequality and for the relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth.
The analysis presented here is only a …rst step towards understanding the role of preference heterogeneity for saving and wealth inequality. Many potentially important features are abstracted from. For example, preference parameters could be correlated with labor earnings (Knowles and Postlewaite 2003) , or they could interact with other sources of heterogeneity, such as access to the stock market (Guvenen 2002 ). These extensions are left for future work.
The Model
The economic environment is a version of the stochastic incomplete markets life-cycle model commonly used to study the wealth distribution (e.g., Huggett 1996) . 2 The economy is inhabited by a continuum of households of unit mass, by a single representative …rm, and by a government. All markets are competitive and the economy is in steady state.
Households
A household lives for at most a D peridos. At birth, a household is endowed with wealth k 1 = 0, with a permanent labor endowment q 2 f! 1 ; :::; ! Q g, drawn from the distribution P q , and with a transitory labor endowment e 1 2 f" 1 ; :::; " E g, drawn from the distribution P e 1 . Preference heterogeneity takes the simplest possible form. At birth, each household draws a vector of preference parameters ( ; ) from the distribution . is the time discount factor and 1= is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. There are J preference types, indexed by j. The problem solved by a household endowed with preferences j ; j is given by
subject to the budget constraint
and the borrowing constraint k a+1 0. Here, a indexes age, a D is the household's stochastic lifetime, c denotes consumption, r is the (constant) rate of return to capital, w is the after-tax wage rate, a is a lump-sum transfer which depends on age. The labor endowment, l a = h a e a q, is the product of a permanent endowment (q), a transitory endowment (e a ), and a deterministic age-e¢ ciency pro…le h a . During retirement (a > a R ) the household does not work so that l a = 0.
The household problem may be represented as a stationary dynamic program with a state vector s = (a; k; e; q; j):
P e e; e 0 V s 0 subject to the budget constraint
P s (a) denotes the probability of surviving from age a to a+1. The Markov transition matrix P e governs the evolution of transitory labor endowments over time. If the household dies, his terminal wealth is con…scated by the government. Then the household is replaced by a new person of age 1.
Firms
A single representative …rm solves a standard static pro…t maximization problem. It rents capital K and labor L from households so as to maximize
where F is a constant returns to scale production function. Pro…t maximization requires that factor prices equal marginal products:
Government
The government taxes labor income at a proportional rate and provides lump-sum transfers to retired households. The wage tax rate is w , so that the after-tax wage rate is given by w = (1 w ) q L . Transfers are paid in equal amounts to all retired households. Hence, a = 0 if a a R and a = R otherwise, where R is a constant. Aggregate transfer payments amount to X = R (s) s ds, where (s) denotes the density of households over states. All bequests are con…scated. Denote the aggregate bequest ‡ow by B. Any excess tax revenues are used for government consumption (C G ). The government budget constraint is therefore
Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of aggregates (K; L; C; C G ; X; B), a price system (w; r; q K ; q L ), a value function (V [s]), a policy function (c [s]), and a distribution over household types, (s), such that:
The policy functions and the value function solve the household problem.
Firms maximize pro…ts.
Markets clear.
The government budget is balanced.
The distribution of household types, (s), is stationary.
Household prices are given by w = (1 w ) q L and r = q K .
The capital market clearing condition is
The aggregate bequest ‡ow, B, equals the savings of all households who die in the current period.
Discussion
The model is intentionally similar to the well-understood benchmark studied by Huggett (1996) . Based on the …ndings of Hendricks (2004) , bequests are abstracted from.
Preference heterogeneity takes the simplest possible form. Households are endowed with preference parameters that remain …xed over the entire lifespan. Clearly, some restrictions on the time variation of preferences is necessary to prevent the model from becoming vacuous. The assumption made here is common in the literature (e.g., Samwick 1998; Guvenen 2002). Krusell and Smith (1998) model preferences as following a Markov chain, but interpret their model as approximating a life-cycle model with age invariant preferences for individuals. Habit formation o¤ers one alternative where preference parameters are …xed, but the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is time-varying (Diaz et al. 2002) .
Some readers have suggested that preference heterogeneity could interact with other sources of heterogeneity that are not modeled here. For example, households have access to assets of di¤erent risk-return combinations. For example, Knowles and Postlewaite (2003) suggest that patience and earnings may be positively correlated. This might help account for high wealth observations, but it might make it harder to generate wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings. This paper abstracts from these possible extensions. The objective is to evaluate the implications of parsimonious models of preference heterogeneity in a benchmark life-cycle model.
Model Parameters
The choice of most model parameters follows the benchmark model of Huggett (1996) . The model period is one year. Households are thought to enter the model at age 22 and live at most until age 90. Mortality rates are taken from the 1997 Social Security Life Tables.
The utility function is iso-elastic, u (c) =
. If there is no preference heterogeneity, I set = 1:5 and choose such that the aggregate capital output ratio is K=Y = 3:1 (Castaneda et al. 2002) .
The mean age-productivity pro…le h a is estimated from 1990 PUMS data. The transition matrix for transitory labor endowments approximates an AR(1) process of the form ln (e a+1 ) = ln (e a )+" a+1 with " a N 0; 2 " . Processes of this type are commonly estimated in the literature. Here, I consider two processes, which di¤er in the fraction of earnings inequality due to permanent (q) versus transitory (e) shocks. The …rst process, which is taken from Storesletten et al. (2003), attributes all earnings inequality at age 1 to permanent endowments (q), while the second process attributes it entirely to transitory endowments (e). In both cases, the parameters and 2 " are chosen to match the empirical age pro…le of the variance of log earnings as reported by Storesletten et al. (2003) . All of the …ndings are very similar for both processes.
The production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form:
The parameters A and are chosen such that the equilibrium factor prices are q L = 1 and r = 0:04. The wage tax rate is set to w = 0:4 following Trostel (1993). Retirement transfers amount to 40% of mean after-tax earnings per working household (De Nardi 2003) .
Since the data used to parameterize the model are taken from samples that fail to oversample the rich, the model economy should be thought of as representing the lower 99% of the earnings and wealth distribution (see Juster et al. 1999 ).
[Insert 
Findings
This section explores the implications of preference heterogeneity for wealth inequality and for the relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth. The analysis begins with a baseline model in which all households share the same preference parameters. This model implies the two discrepancies relative to the data highlighted in the introduction: (i) The richest model households hold less wealth than in the data.
(ii) The relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth is far tighter than in the data. I then explore how these …ndings change when households di¤er in their time discount rates or in their risk aversion coe¢ cients.
Wealth Inequality and Age
Before showing the model results, this sections describes how the data on wealth inequality by age are constructed. In cross-sectional data, the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth are roughly ‡at over the age range 25 to 65 with a peak around age 20 (Diaz-Giminez et al. 1997; Budria et al. 2002) . However, to be comparable with the model economies, the data should be drawn from a source that does not oversample the rich, such as the PSID. Moreover, cohort e¤ects need to be removed to isolate the changes in inequality as cohorts age. Since estimates of this kind have not appeared in the literature, I construct new estimates based on the 1968 to 1999 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). My measure of wealth is the variable WEALTH2 from the PSID's wealth supplement. It includes …nancial assets, durables, and real estate net of any debts. It does not include pension wealth. Wealth is observed in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999 .
Divide households into 5 year cohorts according to the birth year of the household head. For each cohort-year cell containing at least 50 observations, I calculate the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth. Figure 1 plots these Gini coe¢ cients against the mean age of the head in each cell. Gini coe¢ cients clearly fall with age from near 0.9 around age 25 to 0.6 around age 65.
To disentangle age and cohort e¤ects, I regress each cell's Gini coe¢ cient on age, age 2 , and on cohort dummies. The solid line in …gure 1 shows the predicted age-Gini pro…le for the default cohort born in 1936 (who retires near the end of the wealth data). Wealth inequality declines as cohorts age. The Gini coe¢ cients drop from 0.87 at age 25 to 0.65 at age 60 and level o¤ thereafter. In what follows, I take these predicted Gini coe¢ cients as representing the data. My …ndings are consistent with Menchik and Jianakoplos (1993) who estimate age e¤ects for households in the National Longitudinal Surveys starting at age 45.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
No preference heterogeneity
The implications of the baseline model without without preference heterogeneity are close to the well-known benchmark studied in Huggett (1996) . Table 2 shows points on the the cross-sectional Lorenz curve of wealth. The data are constructed from 1989 wealth supplement of the PSID. Similar …ndings are obtained from other years (see also Huggett 1996; Budria et al. 2002) .
The implications of the model economies are shown for the two labor endowment processes described in section ??. The model reproduces a large part of observed wealth inequality, but fails to account for the largest wealth holdings. The richest 1% of households hold 11% in the model compared with 24.4% in the data. The discrepancy would be even larger if SCF data were used for comparison.
[Insert table 2 here] Table 3 shows three indicators that characterize the relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth. The data are taken from Hendricks (2004) . Lifetime earnings is the discounted present value of labor income between that ages of 25 and 65. To motivate the indicators displayed in table 3, consider the implications of a simple life-cycle models without uncertainty or borrowing constraints. Such models imply that lifetime earnings and age the determinants of household wealth. Hence, the correlation between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings (C W E ) equals one, and wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings is "small." One measure of this inequality is the average Gini coe¢ cient among households in the same lifetime earnings decile (Gini). In such simple models, all wealth inequality at a given age stems from di¤erences between earnings rich and earnings poor households. One measure of these di¤erences is the 90/20 ratio R 90=20 de…ned as follows. Let x j = M edian retirement wealth j M ean lif etime earnings j for lifetime earnings decile j. Then
It is shown in Hendricks (2004) that much of the intuition obtained from the simplest life-cycle model remains valid in the more complicated models that are commonly used to study the wealth distribution. Life-cycle models imply a relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth that is far tighter than in the data. Wealth inequality stems, in large part, from large wealth gaps between earnings rich and earnings poor households (high R 90=20 ratios).
The data look very di¤erent (Venti and Wise 2000; Hendricks 2004 ). The correlation coe¢ cient C W E is on the order of 0.5, compared with 0.95 in the baseline model. Empirically, households of similar lifetime earnings hold very di¤erent amounts of wealth. The Gini coe¢ cient is at least 0.5, compared with less than 0.3 in the baseline model. On the other hand, the R 90=20 ratio is only about 2 in the data, which is less than half of its model counterpart. It is shown in Hendricks (2004) that these indicators are robust against a number of model extensions that may be important for understanding wealth inequality, including bequests and entrepreneurship.
Observations of this kind, especially large wealth di¤erences among observationally similar households, are commonly cited as reasons for considering economies with preference heterogeneity (e.g., Knowles and Postlewaite 2003) .
Discount rate heterogeneity
This section examines to what extent discount heterogeneity helps resolve the discrepancies between the baseline model and data. I assume that all agents share the same , but di¤er in their values. This type of preference heterogeneity has been studied by Samwick (1998), Andolfatto and Redekop (1998) , and Cagetti (2003) . Heterogeneity in risk aversion is examined in section 3.4.
As a tractable approximation of a general distribution of values over households, I assume that preference parameters lie on a grid that is wide enough to encompass most empirical estimates: 3. The points on the Lorenz curve of wealth shown in table 2.
E¤ects of discount rate heterogeneity
Before presenting results from the calibrated model, it is useful to study a simple case which illustrates how discount rate heterogeneity a¤ects the equilibrium properties of interest. For the remainder of this section, I restrict the grid to the two points surrounding the value of the baseline model: 2 f0:94; 0:98g. The preference weights, ! b , are chosen to match the target capital-output ratio.
The e¤ect of heterogeneity on the wealth distribution is shown in table 4. Relative to the baseline case without preference heterogeneity, more (impatient) households are pushed towards zero wealth. At the same time, the fraction of wealth held by the richest households increases slightly.
Quantitatively, the e¤ect is much smaller than in Krusell and Smith (1998) . The reason is that the households studied here are …nitely lived, retire when old, and do not leave bequests. Abstracting from bequests could be a concern, but it is shown in Hendricks (2004) that neither accidental nor intended bequests have large e¤ects on the model properties studied here. One reason is that, in the data as well as in calibrated model economies, the majority of households leaves either no or only very small bequests. This is not the case in Krusell and Smith's model, where households do not decumulate wealth in retirement.
[ Insert table 4 here] Table 5 shows how discount rate heterogeneity a¤ects the relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth. Wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings rises substantially. The Gini coe¢ cient increases from 0.28 to 0.39. The correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth declines, but remains much higher than in the data. The wealth gap between earnings rich and earnings poor households increases as more (impatient) households hold very little wealth.
These …ndings conform to basic life-cycle intuition. Di¤erences between patient and impatient households account for the higher wealth Gini coe¢ cients within lifetime earnings deciles and for the lower correlation between lifetime earnings and wealth. The latter is also due to the fact that a larger fraction of (impatient) households hold no wealth. The wealth gaps between earnings rich and earnings poor households do not fall for two reasons: (i) The median wealth household in each lifetime earnings decile is likely of the same preference class. (ii) Impatient households in low lifetime earnings deciles enter into retirement holding very little wealth.
[ Insert table 5 here] Next, I examine how discount rate heterogeneity a¤ects the age pro…le of inequality measures. The idea is to determine whether consumption and wealth inequality are sensitive to preference heterogeneity and thus informative about the distribution of preference parameters. Figure 2 shows the age pro…le of the variance of log consumption. The data are taken from Storesletten et al. (2003) . Consistent with their …ndings, consumption inequality is slightly too high in the baseline model, but varies roughly in the right way with age. 3 Since preference heterogeneity should further increase consumption inequality, this …nding suggests that there may be little scope for preference heterogeneity. However, …gure 2 also reveals that consumption inequality increases only slightly for the model with heterogeneity. I conclude that the age pro…le of consumption inequality does not contain precise information about the distribution of preference parameters and is therefore of limited usefulness as a calibration target for this paper.
[Insert …gure 2 here] The …ndings are very di¤erent for the age pro…le of wealth inequality shown in …gure 3. The baseline model implies a distinct U-shape for the Gini coe¢ cients (see also Huggett 1996) , while wealth inequality declines with age in the data. Time preference heterogeneity also has a much stronger e¤ect on wealth inequality by age than it did on consumption inequality by age. These …ndings suggest that the age pro…le of wealth inequality is informative about the distribution of preference parameters and provides a useful calibration target.
[Insert …gure 3 here]
Replicating the age pro…le of wealth inequality
This section contains the main …ndings of the paper. The distribution of preference weights is chosen to replicate the observed age pro…le of wealth inequality. Table 6 shows these weights. Most mass is assigned to households with = 0:96 or = 1, but all lower s also have some mass. The algorithm assigns no mass to households with > 1.
[Insert Figure 4 shows that the model comes quite close to replicating the observed age pro…le of wealth Gini coe¢ cients. It has long been recognized the life-cycle models have di¢ culties accounting for the age pro…le of household wealth (Huggett 1996) . This is a signi…cant success.
[Insert …gure 4 here] [Wealth inequality by age] The changes in the cross-sectional wealth distribution and in the relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth are similar to the case of two values studied in the previous section, but quantitatively more pronounced (see tables 7 and 8). Impatient households often hold zero or near zero wealth. As a result, the model economy substantially understates the fraction of wealth held by the lower 80% of households. The richest households hold slightly more wealth than in the baseline model, but most of the gap relative to the data remains. The richest 1% of households hold 14% of wealth, compared with 24% in the data.
Substantial progress is made towards accounting for wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings. The Ginicoe¢ cients of 0.55 is slightly larger than in the data. The correlation coe¢ cient C W E drops from 0.95 in the baseline model to 0.71 (around 0.5 in the data). The 90/20 ratio rises as impatient low earnings households enter into retirement holding very little wealth.
If preference weights are chosen to replicate the age pro…le of consumption inequality, the …ndings are qualitatively similar. However, the e¤ects of preference heterogeneity are smaller. Details are relegated to the appendix.
Match cross-sectional wealth distribution
The previous section showed that the contribution of time preference heterogeneity towards accounting for high wealth observations is modest, if preference parameters are chosen to replicate observed age-inequality pro…les. It is useful to ask whether preference heterogeneity could be more important, if the distribution of preference parameters were chosen in a di¤erent way. One way of obtaining an upper bound for the role of preference heterogeneity is to choose preference weights so as to match points on the Lorenz curve for wealth. It may appear at …rst that this experiment would be trivial, were the values not restricted to lie on a grid. For each observed household, it should be possible to choose a for one model household to exactly replicate observed wealth. 4 However, the experiment is not trivial because of the way the model's wealth distribution is constructed. A large number of households are simulated and all simulated observations are treated as a single cross-section. Each model household therefore contributes many observations to this distribution (one for each age). Cross-age restrictions limit the set of distributions the model economies can generate.
The preference weights that best replicate the observed wealth distribution are shown in table 9. The algorithm places most mass on = 0:96, but all preference classes have some weight. This includes the most patient classes, which are needed to raise the fraction held by the richest households.
[ Insert table 9 here] [Beta weights] The implied age pro…les of inequality di¤er substantially from the data. The model economy generates too much wealth inequality among the young, but too little among the old (…gure 6). Consumption inequality is also too high among the young (…gure 5). The intuition is that some very patient households consume very little when young and rapidly accumulate wealth.
The model's wealth distribution accords much better with the data than that of the baseline model (table 10) . Still, the contribution towards accounting for the highest wealth holdings remains modest. The richest 1% of households hold 16% of wealth, compared with 24% in the data. The implications for the relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth are similar to the models studied previously. C W E falls from 0.95 to 0.71. The Gini coe¢ cient rises almost to the observed value of 0.5. However, this is partly due to very high Ginis for the lower lifetime earnings deciles that are o¤set by too low Ginis for the higher deciles.
[ 
Summary
If the distribution of preference parameters is disciplined to replicate the observed age inequality pro…les of consumption or wealth, the contribution of time preference heterogeneity towards accounting for the observed concentration of wealth is modest. The fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households rises slightly, but still falls far short of the data. At the same time, too many impatient households are pushed towards zero wealth. Even if preference parameters are chosen to match points on the Lorenz curve for wealth, the model economies do not come close to replicating the largest wealth holdings. Time preference heterogeneity is more promising for understanding how wealth inequality changes with age and why households with similar lifetime earnings hold very di¤erent amounts of wealth. The model economies come very close to replicating the observed age pro…le of wealth inequality and the empirical Gini coe¢ cients of retirement wealth within lifetime earnings deciles. However, the correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth remains too high. Moreover, all of the model economies substantially over-predict the wealth di¤erences between earnings rich and earnings poor households.
Heterogeneity in risk aversion
This section examines the role of heterogeneity in risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Given the assumed utility function, these are inevitably linked. The main …nding is that IES heterogeneity does not signi…cantly a¤ect wealth inequality or the relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth.
To demonstrate this point concisely, I present results for an arbitrary, large amount of heterogeneity. The experiment assigns half of the households = 1 and the other half = 5. The value of is chosen to match the target capital-output ratio. Very similar results are obtained, if the distribution of weights is calibrated to match either the age pro…les of consumption or wealth inequality or points on the Lorenz curve of wealth. Table 13 shows that heterogeneity has only minimal e¤ects on the cross-sectional distribution of wealth. The fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households changes by only 0.2 percentage points. Similarly, table 14 reveals that the relationship between lifetime earnings and wealth is changed only marginally. The Gini coe¢ cient of retirement wealth within lifetime earnings deciles rises by 0.03. The main change is the increase in the 90/20 ratio from 4.5 to 8.0. The age pro…le of consumption inequality is essentially unchanged. Wealth inequality within age classes increases slightly for younger households, but not for older households.
[Insert The intuition for the limited importance of IES heterogeneity is as follows. Varying has two opposing e¤ects on consumption growth. A higher makes consumption smoothing more valuable. As a result, the desired age consumption pro…le becomes ‡atter. Young consumption rises and old consumption falls. A higher also increases risk aversion. Households therefore wish to insure against low future earnings draws by holding more precautionary wealth. As a result, young consumption declines until a bu¤er stock of wealth has been accumulated. These e¤ects partially o¤set each other. Figure 7 shows consumption policy functions for a household with median labor endowments at various ages. Households with a higher IES consume slightly more because they desire less precautionary wealth. But the di¤erences are not large, typically less than 0.2, even for capital stocks around 10. By the budget constraint, the di¤erences in k 0 mirror those in c, so that the wealth holdings of households with di¤erent values are quite similar. By comparison, …gure 8 shows consumption functions for the model with heterogeneity. More patient households unambiguously save more. The gaps between patient and impatient households are much larger than those between households with di¤erent IES levels.
Conclusion
This paper studies whether simple models of preference heterogeneity help account for two observations that pose challenges for standard life-cycle theory: (i) The richest 1% of households hold at least one quarter of total wealth. (ii) Households with similar lifetime earnings hold very different amounts of wealth. Especially the second observation has been interpreted as evidence of heterogeneity in time preference or risk aversion. The main challenge is to identify ways of inferring the distribution of preference parameters from data on consumption and wealth. The idea of this paper is to exploit the fact that preference heterogeneity a¤ects the way inequality changes with age. I …nd that heterogeneity in risk aversion has only very minor e¤ects on wealth inequality and on the relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth.
Heterogeneity in discount factors has larger e¤ects. Still, it makes only a modest contribution towards accounting for high wealth holdings. At the same time, it tends to push too many households towards zero wealth. Discount rate heterogeneity is more promising for understanding how wealth inequality changes with age and why households with similar lifetime earnings hold very di¤erent amounts of wealth. The model economies are able to replicate the observed age pro…le of wealth inequality very closely. They also come close to matching observed Gini coe¢ cients within lifetime earnings deciles. However, none of the models studied here can account for the relatively low empirical correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth.
The analysis presented here is only a …rst step towards understanding the role of preference heterogeneity for wealth inequality. Many features have been abstracted from that could alter some of the conclusions. (i) Preference heterogeneity could interact with other sources of heterogeneity, such as access to risky assets (Guvenen 2002) or entrepreneurship. (ii) Preferences could be correlated with permanent earnings. One reason, suggested by Knowles and Postlewaite (2003) , might be that patient households invest more in education. This would likely magnify the e¤ect on top wealth holdings, but reduce wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings. (iii) Preference parameters could vary over time, as in models of habit formation (Diaz et al. 2003) or in models where households invest in patience (Becker and Mulligan 1997).
5 Appendix: Replicating the age pro…le of consumption inequality It was noted in the main text that the age pro…le of consumption inequality does not determine the distribution of time preference parameters very precisely. For the sake of completeness, I report the results nonetheless.
The distribution of preference parameters is reported in table 15. Most of the mass is assigned to = 0:96 and = 1. It is therefore not surprising that the changes in wealth inequality and in the relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth are similar to the case of a two point grid studied in section 3.3.1 (see tables 16 and 17) . The contribution of heterogeneity towards accounting for high wealth observations is quite modest. Somewhat more progress is made towards understanding why households with similar lifetime earnings hold very di¤erent amounts of wealth. The Gini coe¢ cient with heterogeneity of 0.42 is not too far from the empirical estimate of 0.50.
[Insert Table 9 : Preference weights chosen to match the wealth distribution. 
